

























Caratheodory, and others following him, have devised such pointless geometries. (See Caratheodory 1963, Skyrms 1993). Let me give an example of such a pointless geometry. Start by designating the collection of all open intervals on the real line as regions. Then declare that the union of any countable set of regions is a region, declare that the intersection of any two regions is a region, declare that the complement of any region is a region, and declare that these are all the regions that there are. This is collection of regions is the so-called Borel algebra of regions. Now this collection of regions includes point-sized regions, regions that differ only in being open or closed, and more generally distinct regions whose differences have size 0. Let us get rid of all such differences by regarding as equivalent any regions such that the differences between those regions have size 0. I.e. let us declare Regions to be equivalence classes of regions that differ at most by (Lebesque) measure 0. This collection of Regions, and their sizes, comprises an example of a pointless geometry. Since any distinct points differ by measure 0, all points will correspond to one and the same Region, namely the Null Region, which is the complement of the Region consisting of the entire space. Any other Region has well-defined finite size (measure). Breaking up and re-assembling never changes the size of a Region. Regions can always be cut exactly in half. And there are no problems about contact between objects since there are no differences between open and closed Regions.
This seems very pleasing. It therefore seems worthwhile to examine whether physics can be done in such a setting. In this paper I will take a look at quantum mechanics. I will argue that the formalism of quantum mechanics strongly suggests that its value spaces, including physical space and space-time, are pointless spaces. 









What is not often noted is that there is a more general conclusion that can be drawn from the assumption that the quantum mechanical state-space is a separable Hilbert space, namely that wave-functions are functions on pointless spaces. To be more precise, it is a consequence of the fact that wave-functions are representations of states in a separable Hilbert space that each wave-function is not simply a square integrable function, but rather an equivalence class of square integrable functions which differ in their values at most on a set of  (Lebesque) measure 0. The reason for this is pretty straightforward. One of the axioms of the theory of Hilbert spaces is that there is a unique vector whose norm (inner product with itself) is zero. In the position representation, the norm of a wave-function f(x) is |f(x)|2dx. But there are many different functions for which |f(x)|2dx=0. So, in order for wave-functions to be representations of vectors in a Hilbert space one needs to assume that wave-functions correspond to equivalence classes of (square integrable) functions that differ at most on a set of measure 0. Now one can show mappings (homomorphisms) on pointless spaces correspond exactly to equivalence classes of functions that differ at most on a set of measure 0 (see Skyrms 1993). Thus wavefunctions are functions on pointless spaces. Quantum mechanics  thus provides us with evidence that the value-space for any continuous observable is a pointless space. However, let me now turn to two ways in which point values for continuous observables can be re-introduced into quantum mechanics.

3 Rigged Hilbert spaces




Lets use the simplest example, the harmonic oscillator. I will assume that the reader is familiar with the construction of the ladder of eigenstates φn=(a+)nφ0 /n! of the number operator N, which starts at the bottom with the state φ0 which has the feature that Nφ0=0. Let us now consider all and only the finite superpositions of these states, i.e. the states of form φ=cnφn , where we superpose only finitely many φn. Let us denote this linear space of states as Ψ. Using the standard scalar product (φ,ψ) and norm |ψ|2=(ψ,ψ) one can then define the standard Hilbert space topology on the space Ψ, and the accompanying standard notion of convergence: φkφ iff |φk-φ|0 as k. Given this topology the space Ψ is not complete, i.e. there exist Cauchy sequences (converging sequences) that have no limit point in Ψ. If one now completes Ψ by adding all such limit points, one obtains the standard Hilbert space H of the harmonic oscillator. It is important to note that this has as a consequence that the Hilbert space H will contain infinite energy states: there will exists Cauchy sequences of states φ1=c1E1, φ2=d1E1+d2E2, φ3=e1E1+e2E2+e3E3, ........., such that as n, the expectation value of Energy=(1/|ci|2)(|ci|2Ei). (each Ei  denotes an energy eigenstate). By the completeness of the Hilbert space H there must exist a limit state corresponding to each Cauchy sequence. Hence there will exist a state that one can reasonably call an infinite energy state, even though this state, strictly speaking, is not in the domain of the energy operator. 
Let us now define a different topology, a nuclear topology, on Ψ and the accompanying different, nuclear, notion of convergence: φkφ iff ((φk-φ),(N+1)p(φk-φ))0 as k for any p. Roughly speaking, the factor (N+1)p is a factor designed to weigh the higher number eigenstates heavier than the lesser number eigenstates, so that differences in the higher number coefficients have to converge to 0 very rapidly if the norm ((φk-φ),(N+1)p(φk-φ)) is to converge to 0 as k converges to infinity.  Thus any sequence of states in Ψ that is a Cauchy sequence according to the nuclear topology is also a Cauchy sequence according to the Hilbert space topology, but not vice versa. Now let us complete Ψ according to the nuclear sense of convergence. Of course, this will add only a proper subset of the states that get added when one completes Ψ according to the Hilbert space topology. We then obtain a linear topological space of states Φ. 








A rigged Hilbert space, i.e. a Gelfand triple  ΦHΦX, is a not as simple and natural a state-space as a Hilbert space. Just look at the machinery that I needed above in order to explain the basics of rigged Hilbert spaces, and compare it to the simplicity and naturalness of (the axioms of) the normal (separable) Hilbert space formalism. Moreover, a rigged Hilbert space is a rather non-unified, cobbled together, state-space which consists of 3 quite distinct parts Φ, H and ΦX, where states in the distinct parts have distinct properties. For instance, given any two states φ and ψ in H, one can take their scalar product <φ|ψ>, which is a complex number. But the scalar product <f|g> of states f and g that are in ΦX but not in H, is not an ordinary complex number. The scalar product in ΦX exists only in a distributional sense, i.e. it is defined as the distribution which satisfies <f|φ>=dg<f|g><g|φ> for all φ in Φ. And there is the awkward, but essential, use of two distinct topologies, the one corresponding to the usual inner product, the other being the nuclear topology. Its all rather messy.




In the specific case of the observable Energy, matters are even worse. There is a relatively clear sense in which position eigenstates are infinite energy states. Consider any sequence of wave-functions {ψi(x)} which is such that each ψi(x) has a well-defined finite expectation value for its energy, and which becomes more and more concentrated around a given point in space, i.e. suppose that in the limit as i goes to infinity the wave-functions ψi(x) become arbitrarily well confined to arbitrarily small regions around that point in space. One can then show that the expectation value of energy of this sequence of states must increase without bound as i goes to infinity.​[1]​
 It seems that we have a a bit of a dilemma. Either position eigenstates are physically possible, in which case, in a rather clear sense, gross violations of energy conservation are possible. This seems implausible. Or they are not physically possible, in which case it is unclear why one would go to such lengths in order to introduce such states into the quantum mechanical state-space. This dilemma can be brought ought a bit more sharply by considering the dynamics of quantum states.




On the other hand, suppose that one believes that during measurements the dynamics is governed by the projection postulate. And suppose that exact position measurements were possible. Then one could, with certainty, create an infinite energy state by measuring the exact position of a particle. While this could be a great boon, or a great disaster, to humanity, it seems implausible that this could ever happen. However, if position eigenstates could not possibly be produced by such measurements, nor by a unitary dynamics, why introduce the mathematical artifice of position eigenstates in the first place? 
In general it would seem that eigenstates of continuous observables, at best, are redundant. Since, in addition, they complicate the mathematical formalism, it seems best to not countenance them in the first place. 

4. Recovering point values in the algebraic approach 




Suppose that physical space is pointless. And suppose that in order to completely specify the locational state of an object one has to specify for each Region whether the object is entirely confined to that Region. It would then seem that, despite the fact that no point-sized Regions exist, nonetheless there can be point-sized objects with point-like locational properties. For instance, suppose that the locational state of an object is as follows: it is wholly confined to each of the following Regions: (-1,1), (-1/2, 1/2), (-1/4,1/4), ..... . The only possible understanding of that collection of locational properties is surely that it is a point particle which is located exactly at point x=0. Of course there is no Region that corresponds to this point. But it seems impossible to understand the locational properties of the object in any other way: it is smaller than any Region, so it can not have finite size, and it is located in each of a set of Regions that converge to point x=0. Thus it appears that the fact that space is pointless does not rule out states of objects that correspond to the occupation of a point-sized location. This, in essence, is the way in which Halvorson re-introduces point values in the algebraic approach to quantum mechanics.




Nonetheless, as I explained with my analogy, on the algebraic account of quantum states there can be states, so-called singular states, which correspond to point values for continuous observables. For consider a state which assigns Probability 1 or 0 to every projection operator in the algebra {Qs}. Such a singular state determines for any Region of possible values of Q whether the value of Q is inside that Region or not. In particular there will be a set of Regions that converge to a point value for Q such that the value of Q is, with probability 1, in each of these Regions. Thus on the algebraic approach one can introduce states corresponding to point values for continuous observables, and this is exactly what Halvorson suggests doing. Indeed, one can even fit all of these algebraic states into a single non-separable Hilbert space. Now let me quickly evaluate the merits of Halvorsons proposal.




In other respects, the problems with Halvorsons approach are very similar to the problems with the rigged Hilbert space approach. A non-separable Hilbert space which includes all the eigenstates of continuous observables does not appear to be as mathematically attractive as the standard separable Hilbert space. For instance, the fact that it is a non-separable Hilbert space means that standard forms of reasoning in terms of finite or countable superpositions do not go through. Also, as in the case of the rigged Hilbert space, the non-separable Hilbert space decomposes into two quite distinct parts: the part that corresponds to the standard separable Hilbert space (i.e. the eigenstates of discrete observables plus their countable superpositions), and the part that corresponds to the singular states (the eigenstates of continuous observables). Moreover, as before,  a unitary Hamiltonian dynamics can not take one into, or out of, the standard separable Hilbert space. Finally, position eigenstates do not have well-defined expectation values for momenta and energies. And one can not make sense of probabilities of results of measurements of observables which have a complete set of eigenvectors in the standard Hilbert space (the Schrodinger representation).  All of this suggests that we should stick with the standard Hilbert space.





Let me now suggest a modification of the standard Hilbert space approach. As I noted before infinite energy states occur in the standard Hilbert space H. Should we not get rid of all infinite energy states from the standard Hilbert space? A natural way in which to remove all infinite energy states is to go back to the rigged Hilbert space construction, and to let the state-space be the space Φ which is the completion, w.r.t. the nuclear topology, of the space Ψ of finite superpositions of energy eigenstates. As I previously noted this space Φ contains only states with finite expectation values for energy. It also has some other attractive features. One can show that there exists a large algebra of operators such that the expectation value of every Hermitian operator in this algebra is finite for every state, and that every operator in this algebra is everywhere defined. In the case of the harmonic oscillator the relevant operator algebra consists of all finite polynomials in the position and momentum operators. So in space Φ one does not have the problems that one has when one has unbounded operators in a Hilbert space, namely infinite expectation values and operators that do not have the entire Hilbert space as their domain. At the same time it has to be admitted that Φ, in other ways, is not as natural as the standard Hilbert space H:  Φ makes essential use of 2 different topologies, and it does not contain all countable superpositions that have norm=1. So, as yet, it is not obvious which state-space is the better candidate. Now let us shift the discussion from quantum mechanics to quantum field theory.

6 Pointless space-time in quantum field theory
In quantum field theory the fundamental observables, from which all other observables are built, are field observables, such as field strengths, rather than particle observables, such as position, or region, occupation. It would then seem that no conclusions about the existence or non-existence of points in space, or space-time, can be drawn from the existence or non-existence of point values for continuous observables. In fact, one might think that since the fundamental observables are field-strengths at points in space-time, therefore quantum field theory actually presupposes the existence of points in space-time. However, this is not so.




A quantum field Φ(f) is defined as a linear map from test functions f (x) to operators. The test functions are functions on space-time, and the operators are operators on a Hilbert space (or on a rigged Hilbert space). If one takes, e.g. a test function f(x) which is 0 everywhere except in some space-time region R, and is 1 everywhere in region R, then the operator Φ(g) corresponds to the average value of the field in region R. However, one does not usually use such a test function since it is not continuous. If one instead uses a function f(x) that varies smoothly, then one obtains a field operator corresponding to the weighted average of the field values, where the weight is given by the value of the function. Each such linear map from test functions f to operators Φ(f) is usually represented as an integral Φ(f)=Φ(x)f(x)dx, where the integration is over all of space-time. One might think that this construction presupposes the existence of points in space-time, since the smeared field operators are defined in terms of integrations of  Φ(x) and f(x), where Φ(x) and f(x) are supposed to have well-defined values at points x in space-time. If that were correct then the existence of points in space-time would be, after all, presupposed in quantum field theory. 




In the first place there exist linear maps Φ(f) that are not generated by functions Φ(x), but instead are generated by sequences of functions Φn(x). For instance consider a sequence of functions δ5n (x) such that, as n increases, the functions δ5n become more and more peaked around x=5, while, for each n, satisfying δ5n (x)dx=1. Then, for any test function f(x) that is continuous at x=5, the integral δ5n (x)f(x)dx will approach f(5) as n goes to infinity, and thus the sequence of integrals can be said to map f(x) to f(5). This map from f(x) to f(5) is a linear map from functions to numbers which is generated, not by a single function, but by a sequence of functions. The reason why this map can not be generated by a single function is that there exists no limit function to which the functions δ5n converge as n goes to infinity. One can however introduce the notion of a distribution, and define the distribution δ(5) to be such that δ(5)f(x)dx=f(5) for functions f that are continuous at x=5, while being careful not to use the distribution δ(5) in contexts other than such an integration. This will allow us to represent all linear maps from test functions to reals as integrations. 




To sum up, one can indeed think of smeared field operators as being generated by integrations of two types of  underlying quantities. But the underlying quantities are equivalence classes of functions which differ by at most (Lebesque) measure 0. Rather than that this procedure presupposes that space-time contains points, it instead strongly suggests that space-time contains only extended Regions, i.e. that space-time is pointless, since that is the natural habitat of such equivalence classes of functions. 

7 Conclusions
There are well-known conceptual oddities, such as measure theoretic paradoxes and problems of contact, associated with the existence of points in space and space-time. In quantum particle mechanics there are additional reasons to reject states that correspond to point values for continuous observables, including positions. In the first place such states can not exist in the standard separable Hilbert space formulation. They can be introduced, but only at the expense of a prima facie less natural formulation of quantum particle mechanics. Moreover, exact value states for one observable imply undefined expectation values many other observables. Indeed it seems hard to make sense of the probabilities of the results of measurements of perfectly ordinary observables when one starts out, e.g., in  a position eigenstate.
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^1	  Although this is a rather suggestive fact one has to be a bit careful as to what it means. For instance, it is not true that this sequence of wave-functions converges to the corresponding position eigenstate in the sense that the inproduct of this sequence with that position eigenstate converges to 1.
^2	  Here is a very brief indication of why I think violations of countable additivity are acceptable in this case. The sense in which countable additivity is violated in Halvorsons theory is that the probability of a countable Boolean disjunction can be 1 even though the probability of each of the disjuncts is 0. Normally countable additivity violations imply that there exists a countable Dutch book. However, that is not so in this case. The reason for this is that in this case truth need not distribute over countable Boolean disjunction , i.e. one can have it that each of countably many disjuncts is false, while the countable disjunction is true (which is not normally the case).
